Decisions are often made by heterogeneous groups of individuals, each with distinct initial biases and access to information of different quality. We show that in groups of independent agents who accumulate evidence the first to decide are those with the strongest initial biases. Their decisions align with their initial bias, regardless of the underlying truth. In contrast, agents who decide last make decisions as if they were initially unbiased and hence make better choices. We obtain asymptotic expressions in the large population limit quantifying how agents' initial inclinations shape early decisions. Our analysis shows how bias, information quality, and decision order interact in nontrivial ways to determine the reliability of decisions in a group.

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• Social networks
• Diffusion & random walks
• Extreme event statistics
• First passage problems
• Fokker–Planck equation
• Langevin equation
• Monte Carlo methods
• Stochastic analysis
• Stochastic differential equations