Export citation

Export citation

Choose format for download:

Download Citation

    Security proofs for practical QKD: Variations, techniques, gaps, and limitations

    Devashish Tupkary*, Ernest Y.-Z. Tan†, Shlok Nahar‡, Lars Kamin§, and Norbert Lütkenhaus∥

    Devashish Tupkary*, Ernest Y.-Z. Tan†, Shlok Nahar‡, Lars Kamin§, and Norbert Lütkenhaus∥

    • Institute for Quantum Computing and Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, N2L 3G1

    • *Contact author: djtupkary@uwaterloo.ca
    • †Contact author: yzetan@uwaterloo.ca
    • ‡Contact author: sanahar@uwaterloo.ca
    • §Contact author: lars.kamin@outlook.com
    • ∥Contact author: lutkenhaus.office@uwaterloo.ca

    Rev. Mod. Phys. 98, 035003 – Published 8 September, 2026

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1103/28rs-frmw

    Abstract

    The current status of security proofs for practical decoy-state quantum key distribution is reviewed using the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol, with a focus on optical implementations with weak coherent pulses and threshold photodetectors. The primary aim of this review is to highlight gaps in the existing literature. Such gaps may arise, for instance, from mismatches between detailed protocol specifications and proof-technique elements, reliance on earlier results based on different assumptions, or protocol choices that overlook real-world requirements. While substantial progress has been made, this overview draws attention to the details that still demand careful attention.

    Physics Subject Headings (PhySH)

    Authorization Required

    We need you to provide your credentials before accessing this content.

    References (Subscription Required)

    Outline

    Information

    Sign In to Your Journals Account

    Filter

    Filter

    Article Lookup

    Enter a citation