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Evolution of altruistic rationality provides a solution to social dilemmas via rational reciprocity

Mohammad Salahshour* and Iain D. Couzin

  • *Contact author: msalahshour@ab.mpg.de
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Phys. Rev. Research 7, 033211 – Published 2 September, 2025

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1103/sz5b-j75y

Abstract

Decades of scientific inquiry have sought to understand how evolution fosters cooperation, a concept seemingly at odds with the belief that evolution should produce rational, self-interested individuals. Most previous work has focused on the evolution of cooperation among boundedly rational individuals whose decisions are governed by behavioral rules that do not need to be rational. Here, using an evolutionary model, we study how altruism can evolve in a community of rational agents and promote cooperation. We show that in both well-mixed and structured populations, a population of objectively rational agents is readily invaded by mutant individuals who make rational decisions but evolve a distorted (i.e., subjective) perception of their payoffs. This promotes behavioral diversity and gives rise to the evolution of rational, other-regarding agents who naturally solve all the known strategic problems of two-person two-strategy games by perceiving their games as pure coordination games.

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Phys. Rev. Research 7, 033211– Published 2 September, 2025
  • Received 25 April 2024
  • Accepted 7 August 2025
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Published by the American Physical Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license. Further distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the published article's title, journal citation, and DOI. Open access publication funded by Max Planck Society.

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