Countermeasure against detector-blinding attack with estimation of secret-key leakage
Phys. Rev. Applied 26, 014069 – Published 22 July, 2026
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1103/f7h8-j24r
Abstract
We present a countermeasure against the detector-blinding attack (DBA) utilizing statistical analysis of error and double-click events accumulated during a quantum key distribution session under randomized modulation of single-photon avalanche diode (SPAD) detection probabilities via gate voltage manipulation. Building upon prior work demonstrating the ineffectiveness of this countermeasure against continuous-wave (cw) DBA, we extend the analysis to evaluate its performance against pulsed DBA. Our findings reveal an approximately 13 dB increase in the trigger pulse energies difference between default and reduced gate voltage applied under pulsed DBA conditions compared with cw DBA. This heightened difference enables a re-evaluation of the feasibility of utilizing SPAD detection probability variations as a countermeasure and makes it possible to estimate the fraction of bits compromised by an adversary during pulsed DBA.
