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Temporal interaction and its role in the evolution of cooperation

Yujie He1, Tianyu Ren2,*, Xiao-Jun Zeng2, Huawen Liang3, Liukai Yu4, and Junjun Zheng4,†

  • *Contact author: tianyu.ren@manchester.ac.uk
  • †Contact author: 99zhengjunjun@163.com
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Phys. Rev. E 110, 024210 – Published 16 August, 2024

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.110.024210

Abstract

This research investigates the impact of dynamic, time-varying interactions on cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Traditional research has focused on deterministic rules governing pairwise interactions, yet the impact of interaction frequency and synchronization in groups on cooperation remains underexplored. Addressing this gap, our work introduces two temporal interaction mechanisms to model the stochastic or periodic participation of individuals in public goods games, acknowledging real-life variances due to exogenous temporal factors and geographical time differences. We consider that the interaction state significantly influences both game payoff calculations and the strategy updating process, offering new insights into the emergence and sustainability of cooperation. Our results indicate that maximum game participation frequency is suboptimal under a stochastic interaction mechanism. Instead, an intermediate activation probability maximizes cooperation, suggesting a vital balance between interaction frequency and inactivity security. Furthermore, local synchronization of interactions within specific areas is shown to be beneficial, as time differences hinder the spread of cross-structures but promote the formation of dense cooperative clusters with smoother boundaries. We also note that stronger clustering in networks, larger group sizes, and lower noise increase cooperation. This research contributes to understanding the role of node-based temporality and probabilistic interactions in social dilemmas, offering insights into fostering cooperation.

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Phys. Rev. E 110, 024210– Published 16 August, 2024
  • Received 28 March 2024
  • Accepted 15 July 2024
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Published by the American Physical Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license. Further distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the published article's title, journal citation, and DOI.

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